"..the (Japanese) Navy General Staff sought as early as December (1941) to press for control over all of Australia as a major 'stage two' war objective."
From "Japan's Southward Advance and Australia" (1991), by distinguished Japan scholar and historian Professor Henry Frei (1991) at page 163.

"I'm arguing that there was in fact no invasion plan (for Australia)...This conclusion is supported by all the scholarship, notably the late and much missed Henry Frei, whose Japan's Southward Advance and Australia documents the debate and its conclusions from Japanese official and private sources."
From the paper: "He's (not) coming South - the invasion that wasn't" (2002) by Dr Peter Stanley, of the Australian War Memorial

JAPAN'S NAVY PROPOSES A LIMITED INVASION OF THE NORTHERN AUSTRALIAN MAINLAND

How a distinguished historian proves the Australian War Memorial is wrong about our 1942 history

The Australian War Memorial rejects the traditional view that Australia faced grave danger from Japan in 1942

If readers see a contradiction between the two quotations above, that is because the distinguished Japan scholar, Professor Henry Frei, offers no support in Japan's Southward Advance and Australia to revisionist claims from the Australian War Memorial that Australia was not in grave danger from Japan in 1942.

Admiral Osami Nagano, Japan's Chief of Navy General Staff, 1941-42
From December 1941 to early March 1942, Admiral Nagano advocated an early invasion of the northern Australian mainland and cutting Australia's lifeline to the United States. When the Japanese Army insisted that Australia's lifeline to the United States had to be cut and that Australia had to be "throttled" into complete submission to Japan, Admiral Nagano agreed to the Army's plan. Australia's complete surender to Japan was intended to be achieved by "Operation FS". See note on "Operation FS" in the next chapter.

There is compelling historical evidence that the Japanese were planning to make themselves masters of Australia in 1942, either by invasion of key northern areas of the mainland and then severing Australia's lifeline to the United States (Japanese Navy), or by severing that lifeline and then bullying Australia into complete surrender to Japan by blockade and other pressures (Japanese Army).

Despite this evidence, accepted by most mainstream Australian historians, the gravity of the danger facing Australia throughout 1942 has been questioned by Dr Peter Stanley of the Australian War Memorial since 2002. In two published papers "He's (not) coming South: the invasion that wasn't" (2002) and "Threat made manifest" (2005), Dr Stanley claims (1) that the Japanese were not planning to invade Australia at any time in 1942; (2) Australia was never in grave peril from Japan in 1942; (3) the Australian Diggers who blocked and then repelled the determined Japanese advance along the Kokoda Track to Port Moresby did not "save Australia" from invasion* or grave peril; and (4) wartime Prime Minister John Curtin exaggerated the threat from Japan in 1942 for political gain or because he was unable to cope with the stress of office in wartime. English-born Dr Stanley also claims that the apparent need of Australians to believe that they faced a grave danger from Japan in 1942 is "rather pathetic". Despite reported rebukes to Dr Stanley from the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Federal Opposition (Melbourne "Herald Sun", 8 September 2005), the Director of the Australian War Memorial, Major General Steve Gower, AO, has stated by email to me dated 8 November 2005: "Dr Stanley has legitimate arguments in my opinion." A sign encapsulating Dr Stanley's controversial views was still on public display in the War Memorial's World War II gallery on 1 November 2005.

* It appears to have escaped the notice of Dr Stanley and the Australian War Memorial that the Kokoda Campaign was fought entirely on Australian soil in 1942. Unlike the Territory of New Guinea, Papua was never a League of Nations Mandate. Australia exercised full sovereignty over Papua from 1906 until it achieved independence from Australia in 1975.

After reading both of Dr Stanley's papers carefully, I formed the view that his denial of the grave threat to Australia from Japan throughout 1942 and his criticisms of Prime Minister John Curtin were not based on a sound grasp of the strategic situation facing Australia throughout 1942. I also formed the view that Dr Stanley did not have a sound grasp of the structure and functioning of Japan's military high command or its strategic aims and war planning in 1942 that would enable him to correctly evaluate its hostile plans for Australia. If I am right about this, and I believe that I am, then Dr Stanley's criticisms of Australians for their beliefs about the grave peril that their country faced in 1942 also lack substance.

I will deal with each of Dr Stanley's claims in turn.

Dr Stanley's claim that Japan's Navy General Staff was not planning to invade Australia at any time in 1942

The quotation in the box below appears to me to state succinctly the basis of Dr Stanley's claim that the Japanese were never planning to invade Australia in 1942. The quotation is drawn from Dr Stanley's paper, "He's not coming South: the invasion that wasn't".

Dr Stanley is wrong about the level at which Japanese planning to invade Australia was taking place in 1942. He purports to base this claim and his rejection of Australia's grave danger from Japan in 1942 largely on a work by the late, and highly respected historian, Professor Henry Frei called Japan's Southward Advance and Australia. See Historical references. Although Dr Stanley claims that the danger to Australia from Japan in 1942 has been exaggerated, I found no quotations from Professor Frei's work in Dr Stanley's two papers that support his claims.

I have read Professor Frei's book, and consulted it frequently over several years while creating this web-site. I found nothing in that book to support Dr Stanley's claim that only "middle-ranking naval staff officers" were proposing an invasion of Australia in 1942, and his claim that "The plans got no further than some acrimonious discussions." On the contrary, Professor Frei provides very clear evidence that a limited invasion of the northern Australian mainland was being planned and proposed at the highest level of Japan's Navy General Staff through December 1941, and January and February 1942. Professor Frei makes it clear that Australians had much to fear from Japan in 1942, including the loss of their country's independence. It appears to me that Dr Stanley has either misread or misunderstood what Professor Frei is saying about Japan's hostile plans for Australia in 1942. If I am correct in my view that Dr Stanley is wrong, it appears to me that he and the Australian War Memorial have unjustly criticised John Curtin and the many Australians who revere him for his great service to Australia in the year of our country's greatest peril. That service almost certainly contributed to Prime Minister Curtin's untimely death in office in early 1945 at the relatively young age of sixty.

Denial of Japan's hostile plans for Australia in 1942 is very likely to mislead young Australians, and justifies a detailed treatment of the debates concerning the fate of Australia that were taking place in Japan's military high command during 1942. Professor Frei's book is an important resource for those wishing to understand Japan's strategic aims and war planning in 1942, and from time to time, it will be necessary for me to quote from his book to rebut claims made by Dr Stanley that Australia did not face grave peril from Japan in 1942.* In my references to, and analysis of, relevant parts of Professor Frei's book, I will follow the general rule that I mentioned in the earlier chapter Japan's military high command, namely, unless the context indicates otherwise, references to "Army General Staff" or "Navy General Staff" having a view on a particular subject will necessarily imply that the view was held by the Chief of Army General Staff, General Sugiyama, or the Chief of Navy General Staff, Admiral Nagano respectively. * For convenience, references to Professor Frei in the following text will consist of his surname and page references only.

Japan's Navy General Staff and Navy Ministry pressed for a limited invasion of the Australian mainland in early 1942

Although Combined Fleet appeared to have taken the initiative in planning offensive options for the Second Operational Stage of Japan's military aggression in 1942, Navy General Staff had not been idle in the weeks that followed Pearl Harbor. With Japanese-occupied island chains and the powerful Japanese Navy blocking direct access by the United States Navy to relieve the beleaguered American garrison in the Philippines, Japan's Navy General Staff appreciated that Australia’s survival as a free nation and ally would be of vital importance to the United States.

Chief of the Plans Division of the powerful First Section (Operations) of Navy General Staff, Captain Sadatoshi Tomioka, said after the war, "What I worried about most was Australia".* He knew that America's military strength would expand enormously by 1943, but as long as that colossal military strength was pinned down on the Hawaiian Islands and in the United States, he believed that Japan could hold its conquered territories. Tomioka thought that American air power would be ineffective without forward air bases from which aircraft could operate. However, with Australia as a gigantic forward base, the Americans would be able to deploy their massive military strength within striking distance of Japan's southern defensive perimeter and use the islands of the South-West Pacific as stepping stones to recover the Philippines and then move against Japan's home islands.

* Frei, at p. 162. Tomioka was promoted to admiral, and participated in the signing of the peace treaty aboard USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay.

To remove this danger to Japan's southern defensive perimeter, Captain Tomioka argued that it was not sufficient to isolate Australia from the United States; Japan must also invade and occupy key areas of the Australian mainland. Tomioka won powerful support when this argument was accepted by the Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral Osami Nagano.

In my view, Dr Stanley has completely misunderstood what Professor Frei is saying about the debates that were taking place with regard to the fate of Australia. A proper appreciation of the structure and functioning of Japan's military high command in 1941-42, and the relationship between Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, should leave no doubt that when Professor Frei uses the term "Navy General Staff" in the following passages, it represents the views of Chief of Navy General Staff (Admiral Nagano) himself:

"To prevent this (Australia becoming a base for the American counter-offensive), the Navy General Staff sought as early as December to press for control over all of Australia as a major 'stage two' war objective. This would be achieved by invading the strategically most important points on the northern and north-eastern coasts of Australia. Japan would there annihilate the enemy's maritime forces, cut the American-Australian line of communication, and thereby deal the entire Australian nation a thorough blow....The Navy General Staff calculated in its early requests in December 1941 that three divisions (between 45,000 and 60,000 men) would suffice to capture and annihilate the Australian fleet and to secure the flanks and center of the northeastern and northwestern Australian coastlines." See Frei, at pages 163-164. The emphasis is mine.

It really is quite absurd for Dr Stanley to suggest that "middle-ranking naval staff officers" could make requests for "three divisions" from the Imperial Japanese Army. Only the Chief of Navy General Staff Admiral Nagano could make such a request. Further proof that the references to "Navy General Staff" in the passage above are not to "middle-ranking naval staff officers" but to the Chief of the Japanese Navy is provided by Professor Frei in the following passage:

"Luckily for Australia, however, the Japanese army always opposed as too low the navy's estimated number of soldiers needed for an invasion. Time and again the army insisted that it would take take at least ten divisions (between 150,000 and 200,000 men), maybe twelve, to invade Australia." See Frei at page 164. The emphasis is mine.

References to "navy" and "army" in the immediately preceding passage could not be to "middle-ranking" staff officers. The views expressed in this passage would have to be those of the Chiefs of Army and Navy General Staff.

Further confirmation that planning to invade Australia reached the highest level of the Japanese Navy in early 1942 is provided by Professor Frei in his treatment of the Dutch and Australian occupation of Portuguese Timor:

"Disposal of this neutral speck of Portuguese territory with an enemy presence drew heated discussions in the war council. The army pleaded for withdrawal after a cleansing operation, but the navy wanted to retain Portuguese Timor as a forward base in a future attack against Port Darwin and for purposes of invasion. To this end, the Dutch and Australian presence offered a welcome pretext to establish an operational base there by force. Prime Minister Tojo Hideki was totally opposed to Chief of Navy General Staff Nagano Osami in the dispute that raged in the Diet and at the Liaison Conferences from 21 to 31 January 1942." See Frei at page 170. The emphasis is mine.

When the easy capture of Rabaul on 23 January 1942 demonstrated the weakness of Australia's defences, middle-ranking officers of Navy General Staff and Navy Ministry began to urge upon their Army counterparts the need for an early invasion of the Australian mainland. Professor Frei records some of these vigorous debates, but he takes care to indicate that they involved only middle-ranking officers. See Frei, at last paragraph on page 165 to second last paragraph on page 166.

Clinching proof that Dr Stanley is wrong and that debate concerning an invasion of Australia in 1942 reached the highest levels of the Japanese Army and Navy can be found in the following passage from Professor Frei:

"Two days after the fall of Singapore, Army General Chief of Staff Sugiyama Gen moderated the cantankerous dispute (between middle-level Army and Navy staff officers) on the highest level, as he set forth his views on Australia to Navy General Chief of Staff Nagano Osami. The situation for action in Java looked none too bright, said he. But there was hope, and following the defeat of Java the Japanese forces would be pressed to think about the next military operations. These would certainly include Australia, which stood next in the line of assault as it furnished the biggest United States and British bases from which to launch counter-attacks against Japan. Certainly it was important to have an Australia policy, but, at the same time, they also had to reflect on the immense problem of how to control Australia. What they needed was a comprehensive plan that took into consideration all of the country, 'because if we only take one part of Australia, it will surely develop into a war of attritionÉUnless there are in-depth plans that consider the control of the entire continent, it is useless for us to plan for an invasion of only part of Australia. On the other hand, there is no objection to plans to isolate Australia by cutting her lines of communication with the United States.' To this end , plans for invading Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia had great value, and Sugiyama urged that the navy proceed together with the army in a joint study of this operation along already established plans. See Frei, at pages 166-167. The emphasis is mine.

Professor Frei points out that the Japanese Army was not blind to the danger from Australia as an ally of the United States, and was not averse to cutting Australia's lines of communication with the United States by capturing Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia. He goes on to say:

"The army was by no means blind to the Australian danger. Ever since the navy and the army had gotten together in late December 1941 to study the Fiji-Samoa-New Caledonia project --FS Operation*, for short -- the army had been willing to contemplate landings on those islands, assuming that their capture would prevent the United States from establishing Australia as their main beachhead in the Pacific for the counter-offensive....Already at a Liaison Conference of 10 January 1942, army approval of FS Operation had deflected the navy's scheme of capturing Australia, by focussing in a joint agreement on isolating rather than than invading Australia." See Frei, at page 167. The emphasis is mine.

* FS Operation (also known as Operation FS) is explained in greater detail in the next chapter.

In this last-mentioned passage, Professor Frei again shows that Dr Stanley is wrong when he claims that proposals to invade Australia did not proceed beyond "middle-ranking naval staff officers". As I have already explained in Japan's military high command, "Liaison Conferences" were part of the regular functioning of Japan's Imperial General Headquarters - the peak body of Japan's military high command. To draw from the passage quoted, "the navy's scheme of capturing Australia" could only be raised at Imperial General Headquarters by the Chief of Navy General Staff, Admiral Osami Nagano, or his deputy, and it would reflect Nagano's own view. Dr Stanley's "middle-ranking naval staff officers" did not participate in meetings of Imperial General Headquarters, including the Liaison Conferences, and their personal views on naval policy would never be raised at that very high level.

The conversation between General Sugiyama and Admiral Nagano on 17 February 1942 (see above) is of critical importance to understanding why the Japanese Army opposed the Navy's plan for a limited invasion of the northern Australian mainland. The Japanese Army did not want to reproduce in Australia the situation in China where Japan occupied mostly coastal areas of China and the army was bogged down in a seemingly endless war of attrition.

If Dr Stanley read and understood what Professor Frei was saying, I find it very difficult to understand how he could fail to appreciate that an invasion of Australia was being debated at the highest levels of Japan's military leadrership .

I will demonstrate in the next chapter, by further reference to Professor Henry Frei, that the Japanese Army did not want a limited invasion of the Australian mainland; it wanted Australia's complete surrender to Japan.

Japanese Navy General Staff and Navy Ministry agree to deferment of their limited invasion plan for Australia

It appears that the Navy General Staff accepted the logic of General Sugiyama's argument that Japan had to control all of Australia, and that the Japanese Navy's plan for partial invasion of northern areas of the Australian mainland was unsatisfactory because it could produce for Japan another lengthy and unwanted war of attrition of the sort that was taking place in China. At the meeting of Army and Navy Sections of Imperial General Headquarters on 4 March 1942, the Navy agreed to its plan for limited invasion of Australia being deferred. It did not "lapse". See below.

Priority would now be given by Japan's military leaders to the Japanese Army plan to compel Australia's surrender to Japan. This agreement was confirmed at a Liaison Conference at Imperial General Headquarters on 7 March 1942, and formally ratified at another Liaison Conference on 11 March.

The distinguished Japanese history scholar, Professor John J.Stephan of the University of Hawaii has described the proceedings at these three conferences:

"On 4 March 1942 key officers from the army and navy general staffs and ministries came together for yet another attempt to compose their differences. This time they managed to reach a consensus - of sorts. Present were Rear Admiral Takazumi Oka and Lieutenant General Akira Muto, respective heads of the navy and army ministries military affairs sections, and Tanaka* and Fukudome** from the army and navy general staffs' operations sections.

* Major General Shin'ichi Tanaka
** Rear Admiral Shigeru Fukudome

"At this meeting, a wide range of topics came under discusssion, among the most sensitive being the direction and scope of future operations. On this matter, compromise was reached. The navy committed itself to eliminating British forces in the Indian Ocean and undertook not to launch any major campaign beyond the Pacific perimeter in the near future (that is towards Fiji, Samoa, or Hawaii). The army, in turn, acquiesced to tactical operations by the navy beyond the Pacific perimeter ("as opportunities arise') and committed itself to making feasibiliy studies of invasions of Hawaii, Australia, and Ceylon that might be put into practice at some time in the future (when was left vague). These compromises were recorded in a document entitled: 'Fundamental Outline of Recommendations for Future War Leadership'.

"The army-navy modus vivendi of 4 March formed the main item on the agenda of a liaison conference that convened on 7 March. After Army Vice Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Moritake Tanabe had read aloud the 'Fundamental Outline', Finance Minister Okinori Kaya asked what was meant by 'expanding the existing war achievements' (kitoku no senka o kakudai). Tanabe answered that the phrase referred to possible 'supplementary operations' such as invasions of Hawaii, Ceylon and Australia, which the army and navy were studying."

"On 11 March another liaison conference convened and formally ratified the 'Fundamental Outline'. The document was presented to the emperor on 13 March by Prime Minister Tojo, Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama, and Navy Chief of Staff Nagano."

See "Hawaii under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest after Pearl Harbor (1984) at pages 106-107. The emphasis is mine.

In my opinion, these passages extracted from the works of distinguished historians and Japan scholars should be sufficient to establish that no weight can be attached to Dr Stanley's claim that proposals to invade Australia were limited to "acrimonious discussions" between "middle-ranking naval staff officers" or that "by mid-March the proposal lapsed".

Some additional claims by Dr Stanley that need to be addressed

Although it may be thought that Dr Stanley's views on the level reached by Japanese Navy planning to invade Australia have been shown to carry no weight in the foregoing treatment of this issue, four additional claims from his quoted words in the box above need to be addressed. Dr Stanley's quotes are in brown.

"By mid-March the proposal lapsed."

Dr Stanley claims that Japanese planning to invade Australia "lapsed". In fact his actual words are: "By mid-March the proposal lapsed." The word "lapse" conveys an impression that the proposal to invade Australia was dropped or abandoned. This did not happen. The Japanese Navy General Staff plan for an invasion of the Australian mainland did not "lapse"; it was simply deferred or put on the back burner while the Army pursued its own plan to pressure Australia into surrender to Japan. Professor Stephan has explained in the passages quoted above that the document presented to Emperor Hirohito on 13 March 1942 included reference to "expanding the existing war achievements", and discussions that occurred at Imperial General Headquarters mentioned that these words referred to "possible supplementary operations" such as "invasions of Hawaii, Ceylon and Australia". The emphasis is mine.

"The Army dismissed the idea as 'gibberish' "

Professor Frei refers to a mysterious entry in the Imperial Headquarters secret diary prior to the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942 that appears to describe Navy eagerness to invade Australia as "so much gibberish". Professor Frei does not indicate who wrote these words or the circumstances in which they were written. However, Professor Frei follows his reference to this mysterious diary entry with a reference to the revealing discussion between the Army and Navy Chiefs of General Staffs (Sugiyama and Nagano) on 17 February 1942. General Sugiyama's comments to Admiral Nagano included the following telling words:

"....following the defeat of Java the Japanese forces would be pressed to think about the next military operations. These would certainly include Australia, which stood next in the line of assault as it furnished the biggest United States and British bases from which to launch counter-attacks against Japan." See above for full text. The emphasis is mine.

In the next chapter, it will become apparent that the Japanese Army was not interested in the Navy plan for a partial invasion of Australia because the army generals wanted to force a complete surrender from Australia. So the mysterious "gibberish" reference does not advance Dr Stanley's arguments at all.

"Not only did the Japanese army condemn the plan, but the Navy General Staff also deprecated it"

The full text of what Dr Stanley said in the box above is: "Not only did the Japanese army condemn the plan, but the Navy General Staff also deprecated it, unable to spare the million tons of shipping the invasion would have consumed."

Dr Stanley does not provide us with his basis for making this statement. It is an argument usually attributed to the Japanese Army as one of its objections to a full scale invasion of Australia. Professor Frei attributes this argument to the Army at pages 164-165. The argument would be more logically attributed to the Japanese Army because it controlled almost all of the enormous tonnage of merchant shipping appropriated for military use in the Pacific War. Perhaps Dr Stanley would be kind enough to provide us with a reference for this strange claim.

"This conclusion is supported by all the scholarship, notably the late and much missed Henry Frei..",

As I have indicated in the passages quoted above, Professor Frei does not support Dr Stanley's claim that the proposal to invade Australia did not proceed beyond "acrimonious discussions" between "middle-ranking naval staff officers". Dr Stanley also purports to rely for this claim on Midway- The Battle that doomed Japan, by Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya,USNI (1955). A great deal of literature dealing with the Battle of Midway and Japan's strategic planning in 1941-42 has drawn on this book by Fuchida and Okumiya. Even though it raised puzzling issues for me about Midway, I also relied on that book as being authoritative for many years. Unfortunately, this reliance has been shown to be unwise. Fuchida and Okumiya have very little, if any, credibility in the eyes of present-day Japanese military historians. Professor John J. Stephan of the University of Hawaii demonstrated in his book "Hawaii under the Rising Sun" (1984) that Fuchida and Okumiya had omitted any reference to one of Japan's most important strategic aims in launching the Battle of Midway - to capture Hawaii. Without that aim, Midway appeared to resemble the use of a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Senior Japanese naval officers who were also present at Pearl Harbor and Midway, as well as Japan's official war history Senshi Sosho, have also thrown doubt on the accounts of Pearl Harbor and Midway given by Fuchida and Okumiya. See my account of Midway, and especially my chapter "The Tide of Battle turns at Midway". Jon Parshall's "Shattered Sword", to be published late in 2005, is likely to further damage the credibility of the account of Midway given by Fuchida and Okumiya in Western eyes.

Dr Stanley is challenging a widely accepted view that invasion of Australia was being debated at the highest levels of Japan's military leadership in 1942. I believe that I have demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt that authorities cited by Dr Stanley do not support his position, and accordingly, no weight can be given to his views on this issue.

AUSTINVADE

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