Versailles Variant Player Notes
 Contents |
Introduction
Historical Premise
Demographics
Minor Powers
Starting Strategies
Now includes starting strategy notes for all seven Major Powers.
Play Testing
Summary
This variant to the basic Diplomacy game tries to offer something a little different without departing too radically from the original Diplomacy formula. There are no real changes to the game mechanics. The map has been updated for post-Versailles Europe, but has otherwise been kept as close to the standard map as possible. The main change to the dynamics is the concept of introducing active 'proxy' or 'satellite' Minor Powers, to produce a more fluid and variable diplomatic situation. I'll be including some general strategy/opening gambit notes later, once the main variant version has been 'bedded down'.
Why 1929? The premise is that the upheavals of 1929 precipitated radical political change throughout Europe. However, at this stage Germany was not yet totalitarian nor ascendant. Poland could reasonably be assumed (for game purposes anyway) to retain some of the military standing which followed its independence at the end of the First World War, thus gaining Major Power status. Importantly, US isolationism was at its height and can be reasonably assumed to continue for the duration of a game starting in 1929, thus allowing US influence to be credibly left out of the game. Turkey has been included as a Major largely for play balance reasons; also to provide some continuity from the standard diplomacy game. To this extent, some 'designer's licence' has been applied, with an element of 'what if' being included in the game premise.
The main demographic changes which occurred in the post-Versailles Europe of 1929 were the break up of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, the creation of Poland and of a host of new Central European states, some quite powerful in both industrial and military terms. This scenario presents variant creators with some familiar problems. If these new medium sized powers are simply made vacant neutral SCs, it tends to skew the game towards those powers in close proximity to the Central European/Balkan region. It is also strategically unrealistic in historical terms, in that some of the countries could at least be expected to put up something of a fight. On the other hand, a host of neutral powers occupied by 'hold only' armies can delay a game considerably, without adding any particularly new or interesting angle to game play, in either the strategic or especially the diplomatic sense. Please note that the Minors were not chosen to replicate the powers that became (largely pro-Axis) minor participants in WW2. Some of the choice was made off size and potential, but a large part was to try to achieve reasonable play balance and a playable starting position. No apologies for this, even if it discomforts those who prefer strictly historical interpretations!
The Versailles game seeks to solve the power-vacuum problem by introducing one SC/unit 'satellite' Minor Powers which function in game mechanics as separate powers. However, each Minor Power is associated (ie controlled by) with one of the Major Powers. This introduces a new and (in terms of the times) realistic diplomatic factor into the game, without requiring the administrative overhead of having a large number of players, half of whom may have no realistic chance of winning the game.
So, it is hoped a limited number of Minor Powers can be included without unduly slowing down the game, as they are active and controlled by their parent Major Power. Such associations may also in some cases lead to greater interest by Major Powers in what is happening on the other side of the continent and require more (and perhaps subtler) interaction with more distant Powers. This makes the Central/Balkan region a far more realistic proposition, rather than the SC-rich but defenceless power vacuum which would otherwise result.
The fact that, in games using the optional start rules, a Major Power may draw a different Minor ally each game provides another aspect of novelty to keep the interest fresh and make the range of 'standard' opening moves a little harder to predict. I hope 'Versailles' may also help to throw more light on the dynamics of the period which led to the Second World War, but before the situation had become so unbalanced as it had by 1939. It gives you the chance to replay things with some 20/20 hindsight, with the same strategic concerns (though with more political freedom) than the leaders of the time.
This is a new section, which has been expanded in May 2001 to include some notes for all the major powers. They generally deal with broad possibilities largely related to the Major powers, as the various combinations available where minors can be allocated by preference are (deliberately) very numerous. Also, the purpose at present is to outline broad strategies rather than detailed sets of starting moves. These notes are very much 'first draft' in nature and will be refined after more play testing and player feedback.
Poland
One power which really needs to develop a coherent diplomatic and strategic plan early is Poland. In essence, there are two broad options: go east or west. The corollary is that, as Poland, you are seeking to avert the 'classic' (infamous) Nazi-Soviet Pact gambit, where the Soviet Union and Germany simply gang up to destroy you.
An anti-Soviet opening would need a few things to have a chance of success. First, a strategic alliance with Turkey is needed, to ensure the Soviet southern flank is engaged. This would be assisted in the standard set-up by having the Turkish minor Czechoslovakia on the team. Next, at least a non-aggression pact with Germany is also required. British assistance in the north might also be handy, as would the aid of any powers who control either Sweden or Rumania. The aim is to get to the mid game having either eliminated or at least mortally wounded the USSR, having gained some builds and then dealing with whatever balance of power had developed, hoping that this can be achieved without either Germany or Turkey having become insurmountable obstacles. Concurrent expansion towards the Balkans would also be desirable, if it can be managed.
A western, anti-German strategy would seek the assistance of France as the primary ally. If Spain is controlled, some concessions and guarantees there could be used as bargaining power. A friendly Spain, able to assist with naval campaigns against either Britain or Italy if called for, could be a useful French ally. More importantly, the offer to France of a two-front war against Germany before it grows too quickly may be tempting. Naturally, an arrangement with the USSR would be necessary and a Soviet-Turkish war could be a useful adjunct if it can be fomented. Having Britain for a three-way campaign would be extremely useful: it would be interesting to play the 1939 situation out, but with the more favourable map of 1929 and the power equalisation of the diplomacy board! The controllers of both Czechoslovakia and Sweden would potentially be useful allies or dangerous adversaries in any anti-German campaign. The aim here would be to eliminate Germany quickly, and seek to strike a long term alliance with at least one of the remaining powers.
As a general concept, a possible three-way initial alliance could be the B/F/P discussed above. Another possibility is G/P/T, which adds (in the v3.1 Versailles fixed pairings version) Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in the centre and provides Spain to harry France in the west. F/P/T could be a useful counter to the very dangerous 'Ribbentrop' alliance of G/U. Of course, there are many variations and much depends on the early diplomatic atmospherics and the moves of the first year.
Poland is a challenging but very interesting country to play. Like Austria in 'Vanilla' dip, there is the potential to trade on its tactical vulnerability as a diplomatic lever. More than most countries, it's long term health relies very heavily on finding at least one, if not two reliable strategic partners early on. Early tests of v3.1 have shown Poland to be among the statistically more successful countries, especially when there is an early P/T pact.
Italy
An analysis of board and of results so far in various test games show that Italy is in a relatively stronger position in Versailles than in 'Vanilla' dip. Having a bevy of Minor and neutral powers in central Europe instead of Austria is a help, especially now that the Ven/Tri starting dilemma has been removed. France is also a little more surrounded than in 'Vanilla' dip, and Turkey, while it also benefits from Austria having been removed, must still contend with the Minors of Egypt, Greece and Rumania. This should mean that the comparatively weak traditional position of Italy is now balanced out to be at least as good as the other Major powers - possibly stronger than most.
Possible strategic directions? Well, the old Axis still seems a reasonable way to go, allowing mutually acceptable and controlled division of central Europe. In the standard version of Versailles, the two Minors of Yugoslavia and Sweden complement each other quite nicely, although this does leave the prospect of power enclaves behind your lines or on your flanks if the alliance later dissolves after any initial success. Of course, a mutual swap of SCs could also be arranged, though such arrangements are always tricky to execute.
The situation with Turkey is similar to that in normal dip, depending in part on whether that power seems to be pursuing (or is forced into) either a Mediterranean or Continental strategy. Naturally the Minors, especially Egpyt, complicate the situation a little.
The same pretty much goes for France: Switzerland is now in play as a possible target for Germany, France or Italy, with Italy at first likely to be the moderator or decider if both G & F try to take it early. France must also now contend with the Spanish Minor, but otherwise the geography between the two is pretty similar to normal dip.
The addition off Poland makes for some more spice in the centre, throwing up the possibility of participation in an I/G/U carve up, or linking with Poland in order to keep a third power to moderate and check the expansion of G & U. The latter, if done in tandem with an agreement with France, could then become an offensive rather than a defensive arrangement. Of course, an I/U alliance could also be pivotal in checking Turkish expansion. If Britain controls Egypt, then the capacity for a fruitful realtionship between the two is greater earlier on than in normal dip, especially where Italy controls Sweden. If a B/F/P vs G looks like forming up early on, then Italy will be posed an interesting question: join it and reap the rewards, or oppose it (perhaps with an I/G/U)?
USSR
The initial prospects of the USSR seem to hinge perhaps more than most other powers on the initial diplomatic alignments. The main difference from standard dip is that the Austria/Russia/Turkey triangle no
longer exists, making it a bit harder to divide and conquer as before.
Poland and Turkey both border USSR (with Poland replacing Germany, in
tactical terms). But while the Balkans have plenty of minor powers, Poland and Turkey have no direct tension with each other, certainly in the early game, unlike in standard dip.
This seems to mean that the chances of a P/T vs U alliance are very good if Poland is left alone. However, if there is a G/U as well to balance a P/T, or if the P/T does not arise, the Soviet position is strong. And if there is a G/U and no counterbalancing P/T, the Soviet position becomes yet stronger. Furthermore, the absence of Austria means a U/T "Eastern Steamroller" should have very good prospects against Poland and the minor powers in the Balkans (some of which are likely to be controlled by the U/T axis in any case).
The more crowded map, with Rumania and Sweden now minors, does make things more difficult for the Soviets, even though Fin has been added. Ongoing tests of v3.1 will help to determine whether additional neutral SCs need to be made available in the east, to balance early growth prospects relative to other powers.
Turkey
The various merits and implications of power combinations in the east involving Poland and the USSR have been discussed above. Either a P/T or a U/T combination seem viable early strategies. The Balkan situation remains joyously confused, especially if the free selection of minor powers has been permitted.
Italy is probably the biggest early-mid term issue to be dealt with. Much of this revolves around whether Italy seems set to move east or west decisively. From Turkey's point of view, France may therefore be either a logical initial strategic partner, a desirable diversionary target, or both. The owner of Egypt (if not Turkey) will need to be dealt with and an arrangement made over Syria. Depending on the position of the Soviets (who will surely be tempted to explore a U/T non-aggression pact at the least), the main issue will be securing a Balkan build in 1929. Much depends on the ownership of the minors and whether gains can be forced unilaterally (say with Turkisk ownership of Rumania, Yugoslavia or Greece) or must be bargained for.
Germany
While Germany's western situation is similar to that of standard dip, much has changed to the east and south. The 'natural' early accommodation with Austria has been replaced by a decision on how to deal with Poland and the central/Balkan minors, particularly Czechoslovakia. An early 'Axis' with Italy seems logical and productive for both powers, so long as an acceptable agreement can be reached over Austria.
The Polish issue is tougher. Would it be best to make an immediate attack on Poland, in league with the USSR, in order to eliminate that threat early? Or maybe build in the first year and launch in 1930 - unless it's too late by then. If it succeeds, will a Soviet monster be created in it's place, or will it be possible to link up with Turkey in time to check Soviet expansion? On the other hand, if a P/T is allowed to wipe out the Soviets early on, will a strong Poland be too great an obstacle to future German dominance?
The risk of either a two front war (F/P, possibly natural allies) or an F/B vs G early alliance is also of concern. Worst of course would be the 1939 combination of F/B/P, which in Versailles in 1929 is a far more dangerous and powerful anti-German alliance. Early German diplomacy must strive to prevent such an alignment, or to break it up if it forms. As with standard dip, the choice is between a radical early 'activist' strategy (an attack on F, P or perhaps a 'Sealion' against B in partnership with F), or the 'traditional' German acquisition of Lebensraum in a couple of SCs from among Holland, Austria, Denmark and perhaps the minor Czechoslovakia, forming a springboard for later conflict with a major adversary
Britain
Britain's position in Versailles is not that dissimilar to that of England in standard dip. Scandinavia is now a little harder to obtain a foothold in depending on Sweden's allegiances, the Low Countries (Belgium and Holland) are as before, but at least Ireland has been opened up as a growth opportunity once Britain can develop an option to occupy it (this has been made deliberately difficult in games where there is no discretionary initial unit build in 1929).
The early game very much revolves around the 'western triangle' of F/B/G. France is less secure and with fewer easy builds than in standard dip, which may ease initial British paranoia about French prospects and promote cooperation. But then again, it might also make France a tempting target. Then again, if a strong anti-German alliance can be forged (including at least France, one or both of Sweden and Czechoslovakia as minor bloc members, and preferably Poland also), this may prepare the way for a strong British push into Scandinavia and northern Germany.
France
France must deal with a far more complicated environment than in standard dip, principally as a result of the presence of the Spanish minor on the Iberian peninsula. Unless France gains control of Spain up front where minors are chosen by preference, someone with a strong Spanish bargaining counter will need to be dealt with. If it is one of G, B or I, this may well spell early trouble. Unless it is possible to knock out a hostile Spain quickly, without exposing France to a decisive blow from Spain's owner, France will have problems getting that initial expansion necessary to form a solid base for the mid game.
However, if Spain is either controlled or at least friendly at the start, it should be possible for France to make some headway. Belgium and Switzerland are the likely early targets, with much depending on whether an accommodation with Germany is pursued and consummated. Perhaps an agreed split can be reached, or assistance gained from either Britain or Italy to secure the early builds. Much like Austria in standard dip, France is surrounded early and has many potential enemies and allies. Italy is now probably a more important early player in the west, because of the opening of Switzerland as a passable SC and the absence of an Austrian major threat to its immediate east.
Although the early game will be diplomatically challenging, if France can survive the start in good shape, it's prospects seem to improve rapidly. So far, testing seems to indicate it is a more volatile proposition than most other Majors. Ironically, such early perceived vulnerability can also be a valuable (and genuine) diplomatic tool in negotiations with potential alliance partners.
The first public version of Versailles (the six player v2.0) was tested on David Norman's 'Experimental' USTR Judge. Both games are now finished and a new six player version (2.1) is on 'The Clarion' page. At this stage I don't plan to adapt it for the Judge, but anyone who wants to pursue playing it 'manually' is welcome to start up and GM a game. Version 3.0 (which added Turkey as the seventh Major and made other map and rule changes) was tested manually, on Cat23 and elsewhere. The current (new) version, v3.1, is being simultaneously released for play and testing on both the Judge and 'manually'. The Judge adaptation requires some of the variant concepts to be slightly modified, explained further in the Versailles Rules. See the Versailles Games page for more details on the progress of the test games.
So, this variant is all about providing interesting and realistic diplomatic problems. As with standard diplomacy, whilst tactical considerations can be significant, strategic plans and diplomatic interplay remain paramount. That's why the mechanics of Diplomacy are comparatively simple: they should contribute to the game without getting in the way. If this approach is in keeping with your own views, why not give Versailles a go?
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This page last updated on 9 May 2001
