Australia basically had done without a ‘regular army’ since it became an independent nation in 1901. In 1938, it had a ‘permanent force’ of about 1600 officers and NCOs in order to maintain skills in all service branches. Each time the country became embroiled in a conflict an expeditionary force was raised. The Australian Army during 1939-45 was divided into two forces, effectively two armies:

The 2^nd Australian Imperial Force (A.I.F.) was a volunteer force (initially of four infantry divisions, and later an armoured division) whose troops enlisted for overseas duty. Having served in North Africa, Greece and Syria with considerable distinction, three veteran divisions (6^th, 7^th and 9^th) were returning to Australia by late 1942. They were experienced in both attack and defence, but had not been exposed to jungle warfare or the Japanese. Gradually doctrines and techniques were developed, but those who were first involved on the Kokoda track and at Gona learned about it ‘on the job’.

(Note that the 2/x for AIF units stands for 2^nd AIF/ Battalion x to distinguish each unit from the battalion with the same number that fought in the 1914-18 World War as part of the 1^st AIF. e.g. since the 14^th Battalion served in WW1, the 2/14^th was raised for WW2).

The other part of the army was the Australian Military Force (A.M.F.) or national militia, which had a few ‘permanent soldiers’ attached, but was otherwise composed of a mix of enthusiastic volunteers (including WW1 veterans) and some ‘national service’ draftees. The Militia’s purpose was the defence of Australian territory (and this included Papua, which had been a German colony before the 1914-18 war). This political and geographic restriction led to the AMF troops being ridiculed by the all-volunteer AIF as 'a protected species - not available for export' or ‘Chocolate Soldiers’, and other less polite terms.

In the pre-war period, Militia units would have been kept under-strength and under-trained for budgetary reasons. During 1939-1940, the best (young) Militia soldiers volunteered for the adventure offered by the AIF, leaving the AMF very short of energy and expertise. The ranks were then filled to wartime strength with 17-19 year old conscripts. In general, the Militia units of 1942 had limited training and no field experience. In a late effort to improve the standard of these units, AIF officers were removed from their own units and drafted into AMF battalions (replacing the older AMF officers), to the dismay of both sides. Those new officers would need a while before they could trust their men and be trusted by them.

AMF units were usually keen, but unskilled. In New Guinea, they were used initially as labour or construction units, and when called into battle, received a bloody and traumatic initiation. Some rose to the challenge, whilst others found themselves unable to cope with the stress and isolation of jungle warfare*.

By the time of the end of 1942, a number of Militia units had been battle-tested at places like Milne Bay, Kokoda and Oivi-Gorari. The rising level of skill allowed AMF Brigades (and later, Divisions) to be successfully employed against the Japanese in 1943-45 in New Guinea, New Britain, and later Borneo. This was essential if Australia was to maintain a viable army in the field when its manpower resources were stretched to the limit.

*The 53^rd Battalion is the classic example, consisting mostly of young conscripts who had been thrown aboard a ship without warning, bound for Port Moresby. There they lived for months in lousy conditions, spending their days unloading ships or digging ditches, but not training as soldiers. In the desperate days of August 1942 when the Japanese were pushing the 39^th Battalion back along the track from Kokoda, the troops of the 53^rd were armed and marched into the mountains, led by new and unfamiliar officers.

Having struggled over the Owen Stanleys, and seen the wounded being carried or crawling past along the steep, muddy track, the newcomers felt understandably shaky. The 53^rd arrived in time for the crisis at Isurava and were deployed to secure the vulnerable right flank (since there was nobody else available). After losing their new CO and other officers, and being forced to operate out of sight of friendly units, several of the companies of the 53^rd did not have the will to fight. Too many men ‘lost’ their weapons and drifted away from the fearful chaos of that battle; but in hindsight they could not really be blamed. Many of those soldiers were later absorbed into other units, including the 39^th, where they performed very well (including at Gona), after receiving training.